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Constraints on the Soft Power Efforts of 
Authoritarian States: The Case of the 
2015 Military Parade in Beijing 
Camilla T. N. SØRENSEN 
Abstract: Is it possible for authoritarian states such as China, Russia, 
and Iran to combine the soft power narratives directed primarily 
towards an international audience with the narratives directed primar-
ily towards a domestic audience that are aimed at maintaining regime 
security? To investigate this question, this article analyses the 2015 
military parade in Beijing, using this case to highlight and discuss the 
constraints on Chinese leaders’ efforts to project soft power. The key 
finding is that soft power will continue to be the weak link in China’s 
pursuit of a great power position and status as long as what continues 
to count as “Chinese” is defined in opposition to hostile “others” and 
the humiliation narrative continues to function as the central identity 
marker in the party-led construction of national identity (the “us”).  
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Introduction 
On 3 September 2015 China marked the 70th anniversary of “The 
Victory of the Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggres-
sion and the World Anti-Fascist War” (ѝഭӪ≁ᣇᰕᡈҹ᳘ц⭼৽⌅
㾯ᯟᡈҹ㜌࡙ , Zhongguo renmin kangri zhanzheng ji shijie fan faxisi 
zhanzheng shengli) with a massive military parade involving thousands 
of Chinese troops from all military branches: the PLA, the PLA Navy, 
the PLA Air Force, and the Second Artillery Corps (Wang 2015). The 
tightly choreographed military march across Tiananmen Square had 
multiple objectives, with strong messages sent to several different 
audiences. The Chinese population was reminded that it was under 
the Chinese Communist Party’s irreplaceable leadership that the Jap-
anese were defeated and China had hence started moving forward on 
the road to national “rejuvenation” (༽ޤ, fuxing) towards realising the 
“Chinese dream” (ѝഭỖ, Zhongguo meng) and reclaiming its rightful 
great power position and status. The international audience was reas-
sured of China’s peaceful intentions – China will not behave as other 
rising great powers in history have. On the contrary, China’s rise will 
continue to be a “win-win” (ৼ䎒, shuangying) development for the 
world. The parade also had an important external military function, 
which was to show China’s growing military strength and deter the 
United States and its allies from interfering in matters of China’s core 
interests and territorial claims. Judging from the coverage of the par-
ade in the Western media, it seems that the least successful aspect was 
the soft power efforts – it is difficult to reassure the world about a 
“peaceful rise” (઼ᒣፋ䎧, heping jueqi) when at the same time display-
ing the newest and most advanced military hardware, such as the so-
called “carrier killer” missile, the DF-21D, which has the potential to 
destroy US carrier strike groups, the centrepiece of American mari-
time power dominance. For example, the British newspaper The 
Guardian highlighted how the parade used military power to send a 
message about China’s strength and invulnerability, and the American 
news channel CNN in their coverage emphasised how the parade 
allowed Xi Jinping to project China’s growing power and influence in 
East Asia (Phillips 2015; Hunt, Jiang, and Ripley 2015).  
This article analyses the 2015 military parade in Beijing and the 
messages that the Chinese leadership tried to send, using this case to 
highlight and discuss the constraints on Chinese leaders’ efforts to 
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project soft power. The main argument is that for an authoritarian 
state such as China, the focus of the leadership is on maintaining 
regime security, and because nationalism is often used to rally and 
mobilise the population behind the state or, as in the case of China, 
behind the party, it complicates and often works against any soft 
power efforts. The historical nationalist narratives that are often built 
on hostile relations with other countries are not the kind of narratives 
that “shape the preferences of others through attraction,” to cite 
Josephs Nye’s (2004: x) definition of soft power. The analysis of the 
2015 military parade hence demonstrates, first, how difficult it is for 
the Chinese leadership to reconcile the messages they want and need 
to send to different audiences within one common, credible, and 
attractive “China as a great power” story, and, second, how the mes-
sages to the domestic audience always take priority. Soft power, 
therefore, will continue to be the weak link in China’s pursuit of a 
great power position and status as long as what continues to count as 
“Chinese” is defined in opposition to hostile “others” and the humili-
ation narrative continues to function as the central identity marker in 
the party-led construction of national identity (the “us”). In addition, 
the analysis underlines how Beijing’s soft power efforts are also com-
plicated by the fact that China is a rising power, which means that 
strong concerns about how the Chinese leaders will use their growing 
economic and military capabilities – the “China threat” fears – are 
unavoidable, as are intensified security dilemma dynamics. 
The article proceeds in four main steps. First, the scene is set by 
a brief outline of the debate about and practice of soft power in Chi-
na. Second, the theoretical argument and the derived analytical ap-
proach are presented in detail, specifying why and how it represents a 
useful framework for thinking about and analysing the constraints on 
the soft power efforts of authoritarian states. This is further clarified 
and explored in the analysis of the 2015 military parade in Beijing, 
which follows in the third section. The fourth and last part of the 
article presents and discusses important further perspectives on the 
complex contingent dynamics at play between, on the one hand, on-
going domestic trends and developments, especially in party–society 
relations, and, on the other hand, the Chinese leadership’s ability to 
project soft power and generally to promote and manage China’s 
international image.  
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Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics  
In China, soft power (䖟ᇎ࣋, ruan shili) is primarily a top-down, par-
ty-led project. For years now, advancing China’s soft power has been 
regarded as strategically important by Chinese international relations 
scholars, diplomats, and leaders. It is regarded as complementary to 
hard power and hence as part of “comprehensive national strength”  
(㔬ਸഭ࣋, zonghe guoli) (Li 2009b: 22–24). Therefore, the dominant 
view in China is that if China wants to be a great power and have 
great power influence, it must also be able to project and exercise soft 
power (Li 2009a: 2). Furthermore, successful soft power promotion 
and generally the promotion of an image internationally of China as a 
peaceful rising great power is regarded as a crucial part of the Chinese 
efforts to counter or ease the “China threat” fears, especially in the 
United States and in Asia that might otherwise trigger containment or 
balancing behaviour towards China (Zhao 2009: 248–249; Sham-
baugh 2013: 212–215). According to Li (2009b: 31), the Chinese view 
on the use of soft power is that it is primarily to refute the “China 
threat” thesis, and along similar lines Nye (2013) argues that China’s 
soft power strategy is intended to make its hard power look less 
threatening.  
Soft power is hence a popular concept in China. There has been 
a growing number of articles and books on soft power published in 
China over the past decade or so (Li 2009b: 24). In 2007 the former 
Chinese president Hu Jintao declared in his report to the 17th Party 
Congress that it was his objective to enhance China’s soft power. His 
speech then further intensified the focus on soft power among Chi-
nese international relations scholars and diplomats (Li 2009a: 1; Cal-
lahan 2015: 218). In China, soft power is generally framed in Nye’s 
terms, defining Chinese soft power resources in terms of its long 
peaceful history; its rich culture and traditional value system; its 
strong ideology, including its successful economic development model; 
and its approach to state-to-state relations, which emphasises mutual 
respect and state sovereignty as prerequisites for a peaceful and har-
monious international system (Zhao 2015: 2). Chinese officials, how-
ever, appear to be most comfortable discussing China’s soft power 
and soft power strategy in the context of culture, often employing the 
term “cultural soft power” (᮷ॆ䖟࣋, wenhua ruanli) and highlighting 
a long line of positive examples of China’s historical adherence to 
peace and development (Edney 2015: 259; Wilson 2015: 295). In the 
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Chinese foreign policy strategy of “peaceful development” (઼ᒣਁኅ, 
heping fazhan), reference is also made to China as being a benevolent 
great power in East Asia for hundreds of years (Callahan 2015: 219; 
Kang 2007).  
The current Chinese president, Xi Jinping, has maintained the 
focus on advancing China’s soft power. The latter was, for example, 
the subject of the 12th collective study session of the Chinese Com-
munist Party’s politburo in December 2013, where Xi said,  
[We] must pay attention to the shaping of our country’s national 
image, focusing on bringing out the richness and profundity of 
Chinese history, the diversity in unity of our various peoples, the 
image of a great and civilised nation with a rich and harmonious 
culture [… ,] the image of a great nation contributing to human-
kind, and the image of a great socialist nation more open to the 
outside, of greater affinity, full of hope, and full of vitality. (Xinhua 
2013, author’s translation) 
Further, Xi argued that strengthening China’s “international discourse 
power” or “international speaking right” (ഭ䱵䈍䈝ᵳ, guoji huayuquan) 
must be in focus, and that Chinese diplomats and scholars, along with 
Chinese people in general, need to focus on “telling Chinese stories 
well, transmitting China’s voice (ѝഭ༠丣, Zhongguo shengyin) well, and 
interpreting Chinese characteristics (ѝഭ⢩㢢 , Zhongguo tese) well” 
(Xinhua 2013, author’s translation). “Interpreting Chinese characteris-
tics well” relates to the growing Chinese efforts to project soft power 
through its international CCTV 24-hour English-language news 
channel, the Confucius Institutes installed all over the world, the 
English and other foreign-language editions of such newspapers as 
China Daily and the Global Times, and the work underway to set up 
radio stations broadcasting favourable views of China internationally 
(Rawnsley 2015: 276–278). Furthermore, China’s soft power strategy 
includes promoting “mega-events” and cultural exchanges (Zhang 
2012: 623–626). The aim is to balance what Beijing sees as negative 
coverage by Western media of developments in and around China 
and give the Chinese version, thereby helping the international audi-
ence understand the “real China” (ⵏᇎⲴѝഭ, zhenshi de Zhongguo) 
(Hartig 2015: 251).  
Under Xi Jinping, the focus is still to advance the image of China 
as a peaceful great power, but in addition also as a responsible, con-
structive, and increasingly proactive great power that contributes 
  116 Camilla T. N. Sørensen 

positively to the management and solution of international challenges 
and conflicts. Through several speeches given recently, Xi and other 
Chinese foreign policy leaders have articulated a new strategic direc-
tion for Chinese foreign policy known as “striving for achievement”  
(ཻਁᴹѪ, fen fa you wei) (e.g. Xi 2013). They also used other Chinese 
phrases to highlight the turn towards a more proactive foreign policy 
strategy, such as “be more active” (ᴤ࣐〟ᶱ, gengjia jiji), “take greater 
initiative” (ᴤ࣐ѫࣘ, gengjia zhudong), and “actively go in” (〟ᶱ䘋ਆ, 
jiji jinqu) (e.g. PRC 2014). Put together, this indicates a gradual devel-
opment of a new thinking and a new approach in China’s foreign 
policy strategy under Xi and points to a movement away from the 
foreign policy guidelines put in place by Deng Xiaoping in the early 
1990s known under the broader framing of “hide capabilities and 
keep a low profile” (东ݹޫᲖ, tao guang yang hui) (Sørensen 2015). 
This emphasis on presenting China as a responsible, constructive, and 
increasingly proactive great power could be seen as a way to counter-
act the criticism, especially from the United States, of China as a free-
rider in international politics and security and as an aspect of Chinese 
soft power efforts (Saunders 2014: 168–169). However, the emphasis 
in Chinese foreign policy statements under Xi Jinping on China’s 
“core interests” (Ṩᗳ࡙⳺, kexin liyi) and the more assertive and bel-
ligerent Chinese foreign policy behaviour, especially in relation to the 
territorial disputes in the region, has negatively impacted Beijing’s 
wider soft power and public diplomacy campaigns and resulted in 
what Callahan (2015) recently termed “the negative soft power of the 
China dream.” 
Despite all the interests and efforts, soft power is still assessed 
broadly in China as the weak link in China’s pursuit of a great power 
position and status (Zhao 2015: 1–2). The main arguments put for-
ward are that the Chinese political system itself and the above-
mentioned fact that soft power in China is a top-down, party-led 
project whose focus is on China’s history, culture, and ideology as the 
main soft power resources severely constrain Chinese efforts to de-
velop concepts and ideas that are understandable and attractive to 
Western societies that embrace liberal values (Li 2009b: 28–30; 36–
38). This relates to how the party-led presentations of China often 
lack credibility and come across more as party propaganda, which 
does not persuade or attract as planned – except maybe in relation to 
other authoritarian regimes and developing countries around the 
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world, where China’s rise does not represent so much a threat as an 
alternative model of political and economic development (Hartig 
2015: 254; Hernandez 2016). An illustration of this is the mixed re-
action to China’s most visible soft power initiative – the Confucius 
Institutes, which the Hanban, an executive body affiliated with Chi-
na’s Ministry of Education, has established around the world since 
2004. The Confucius Institutes are committed to providing Chinese 
language and cultural teaching resources and services worldwide and 
to contributing to the building of a harmonious world (Hanban 
2016). They are, however, undoubtedly under a high level of control 
by the Chinese state and in Western countries have been met with 
accusations of spying, pushing China’s political and economic agenda 
in the host country, carrying out censorship, and controlling Chinese 
citizens abroad, whereas their reception in most developing countries 
has been more positive (Zanardi 2016: 435). Also indicating the 
growing Chinese awareness of the intrinsic constraints of the top-
down, party-led approach to soft power and the burden that the tra-
ditional Chinese political propaganda institutions put on the success 
of China’s soft power efforts are recent moves to re-brand and mod-
ernise these institutions – for example, the Propaganda Department, 
which is in overall control of China’s soft power policies and re-
sources, has recently been re-named the Communication Department 
(Zanardi 2016: 442). Furthermore, the Chinese leadership under Xi 
Jinping has increasingly been trying to mobilise the Chinese popula-
tion, especially younger Chinese who are studying overseas, to also 
take on the role of public diplomats (Buckley 2016). However, indi-
cating how uncertain the Chinese leaders are about whether the Chi-
nese students can be trusted to “tell the Chinese stories well,” these 
efforts are combined with a reinforced patriotic campaign in the Chi-
nese education system stressing the accomplishments of the party and 
its irreplaceable role leading China’s progress and development. Ac-
cording to a new directive issued by the party organisation of the 
Ministry of Education, patriotic education needs to suffuse each stage 
and aspect of schooling, through textbooks, student assessments, 
museum visits, and the Internet, in order to “organically instal the 
patriotic spirit into all subjects” (Buckley 2016; Xinhua 2016a, au-
thor’s translation). The directive further highlights that students must 
be instructed more thoroughly to “always follow the party” and to 
“establish and maintain correct views of history, the nation, state, and 
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culture” (Buckley 2016; Xinhua 2016a, author’s translation). Similar 
orders were reflected in the new media policy launched by Xi Jinping 
in February 2016, with his visits to several Chinese media institutions, 
including Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television (CCTV), and 
an accompanying speech, in which he stressed that the party is in 
strict control of all Chinese media platforms, including the ones oper-
ating outside China, and that the media institutions have to fall in line 
with the party leadership and play an important role in transmitting 
China’s – the party’s – voice abroad and correctly guiding interna-
tional public opinion. In the speech, Xi Jinping again called for Chi-
na’s international communication capacity to be strengthened in or-
der to increase the country’s international discourse power and to tell 
Chinese stories well (cf. Xinhua 2016b; Bandurski 2016).  
The promotion of Chinese soft power has no doubt been given 
higher priority among Chinese international relations scholars, diplo-
mats, and leaders over the past decade. However, it is also clear that 
domestic politics, and specifically Chinese leaders’ concerns about 
maintaining domestic political control, strongly influence and con-
strain their soft power efforts. The specific character of the con-
straints will be further examined and discussed in the analysis of the 
2015 military parade in Beijing that follows the presentation of the 
theoretical argument and the derived analytical approach in the next 
section.  
Authoritarian States and Soft Power 
China is not the only authoritarian state that has increasingly em-
braced the idea of soft power over the last two decades, but how can 
authoritarian states such as China, Russia, and Iran wield soft power 
in their relations with other countries and societies? The main con-
cern, or puzzle, here is whether it is possible for authoritarian states 
to combine the soft power narratives directed primarily towards an 
international audience with the narratives directed primarily towards a 
domestic audience and aimed at maintaining regime security.  
Soft power as defined by Joseph Nye – the ability to shape the 
preferences of others through attraction rather than coercion – con-
centrates on the positive attractive aspects of soft power as a foreign 
policy tool that has its roots in a vibrant civil society and an attractive 
political culture, so it seems incompatible with authoritarian states. In 
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Nye’s neo-liberal conceptualisation of soft power, a state cannot suc-
cessfully wield soft power until it unleashes the full talent of its civil 
society (Nye 2013; Barr, Feklyunina, and Theys 2015). Nye’s under-
standing of soft power therefore appears limited in its analytical gain 
for authoritarian states, and there is a need to look further than Nye’s 
rather Western-centric understanding of soft power in order to inves-
tigate the ways in which authoritarian states engage in promoting and 
managing their international image and projecting soft power, in addi-
tion to the challenges faced by those states in so doing.  
The theoretical argument put forward in this section starts with 
the observation that the concerns about staying in control and main-
taining power are paramount for leaders in authoritarian states (cf. 
e.g. Köllner and Kailitz 2013). That is, for an authoritarian state such 
as China the focus of the leadership is on ensuring regime security. 
Regime security primarily relies on the foundation of regime legitima-
cy and national cohesion, and a “secure regime” generally refers to 
the condition whereby governing elites are not challenged on these 
two foundational bases (cf. e.g. Jackson 2010: 187; Edney 2015: 261). 
Consequently, the projection of soft power by leaders in authoritarian 
states is subordinate to their domestic concerns. Since nationalism is 
often used to rally and mobilise the population in support of the 
leadership – to enhance regime legitimacy and national cohesion – it 
complicates and often works against any of their soft power efforts. 
That is, leaders in authoritarian states tend to target their narratives – 
their presentations of the history and culture and what characterises 
and differentiates the state or the nation (i.e. the national identity or 
the “us”) – towards the domestic audience. The challenge is that 
there is often a need to construct a hostile world – meaning, a hostile 
“other.” In other words, there is a need to negatively portray other 
countries in order to successfully exploit nationalism – the sense and 
certain use of national identity and historical memory – to mobilise 
the domestic audience. This further implies that soft power narratives 
must not question domestic national cohesion, lest the leadership risk 
becoming vulnerable to ideological threats domestically. The domes-
tic narratives take priority; the soft power narratives are subject to 
those narratives and therefore have to be adjusted accordingly – this 
aspect is even more crucial when the leadership is becoming increas-
ingly insecure and vulnerable domestically.  
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Summing up the argument, the projection of soft power by au-
thoritarian states is contingent upon – and constrained by – domestic 
politics. Furthermore, the content of the soft power narratives is also 
contingent upon domestic politics: if the focus is on attracting other 
countries and societies, there is a need to project a positive record of 
your own historical engagement and role in the international system, 
but the historical nationalist narratives designed to maintain the do-
mestic legitimacy of the leadership and uphold national cohesion 
often present a negative historical engagement with a hostile world. 
The point is that the use of the historical nationalist narratives – and 
the degree of hostility of the “other” in these – will vary with the 
degree of insecurity and vulnerability felt by the leadership. Conse-
quently, the argument on authoritarian states and soft power present-
ed above underlines the need for including concerns about regime 
security and hence the complex contingent domestic/international 
dynamics at play when investigating soft power beyond the liberal 
democratic West. This relates to the call for further research into the 
“de-Westernisation” of the soft power concept, as put forward in the 
conclusion.  
Adding to the argument above, whether or not an authoritarian 
state’s position and status in the international system is changing also 
makes a difference for its projection of soft power. If such a state is 
“rising” – meaning, its relative economic and military capabilities are 
growing – this implies that it will face strong concerns and even anx-
iety, especially from its neighbours, about how it will use these devel-
oping capabilities: what are its intentions? This seems unavoidable, as 
do intensified security dilemma dynamics. This is even more salient 
when the rising power is a non-democratic state where there is little 
transparency regarding debates among and decisions by the political 
and military elite, and where decisions, such as whether to go to war, 
are less influenced by domestic constituents than they would be in 
non-authoritarian states.  
In the analysis of the 2015 military parade in Beijing in the fol-
lowing section, the argument on authoritarian states and soft power 
presented above will be further clarified and explored. The analytical 
approach is to identify the different messages and the different narra-
tives that the Chinese leadership tried to send; to place these in the 
domestic and international contexts – meaning, in relation to the 
domestic and international challenges facing the Chinese leadership; 
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and to analyse their relative weight and their relative success in reach-
ing their target audiences, which leads to the discussion of the com-
plex contingent domestic/international dynamics at play.  
The 2015 Military Parade in Beijing:
Strong Messages to Different Audiences
On 3 September 2015, China marked the 70th anniversary of “The 
Victory of the Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggres-
sion and the World Anti-Fascist War” with the greatest military par-
ade in Chinese history: 12,000 soldiers marched across Tiananmen 
Square backed by a huge display of new military hardware. The par-
ade was designed to serve multiple objectives and send strong mes-
sages to different audiences.  
A main objective of the parade was to strengthen national pride 
and fortify the “right” (read: party-constructed) version of historical 
consciousness. The Chinese population was to be reminded that it 
was under the Chinese Communist Party’s irreplaceable leadership 
that their nation repelled Japanese invasion, reunified, and finally got 
on the right track to regain its national dignity and reclaim its rightful 
great power position and status. In the days before and following the 
parade, there were many reminders in the Chinese press and on Chi-
nese television of the hundred years of humiliation and the Japanese 
wartime atrocities (cf. CCTV 2015). The main message was that the 
century of humiliation was over and that this was made possible only 
by the strong leadership and guidance of the party. The parade there-
fore worked as a clear reminder to the Chinese population of the key 
element of the party’s legitimacy, which ultimately comes from its 
claim to have guided China’s rise: only by maintaining a strong party 
can China continue on this road of national “rejuvenation” (Wang 
2014; Dittmer 2010). The link between the development of the party 
and that of the Chinese nation is emphasised and strengthened in this 
way, but with a focus on the national “rejuvenation” as the goal and 
on a strong party as the prerequisite for achieving this goal. At the 
parade, Xi Jinping took on his role as the strong party leader, in full 
command of the PLA with a strong hold on the nation. As Xi ended 
his speech at the parade, he emphasised,  
 
  122 Camilla T. N. Sørensen 

Having created a splendid civilisation of over 5,000 years, the 
Chinese nation will certainly usher in an even brighter future. Go-
ing forward, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Chi-
na, we, people of all ethnicities across the country, should take 
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theo-
ry, the important thought of the Three Represents and the Scien-
tific Outlook on Development as our guide to action. We should 
follow the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, pursue 
the four-pronged comprehensive strategy, promote patriotism and 
the great spirit of resisting aggression, and forge ahead as one to 
reach our goals. (Xi 2015) 
The above quote also demonstrates that the focus is increasingly 
directed towards the historical struggle of the Chinese nation more 
than the more narrow history of the Chinese communist revolution 
and hence the party – the story is broadened with more references to 
national heroes, not only revolutionary heroes, and to the nationalist 
(Kuomintang), not only the communist, resistance to the Japanese. 
An earlier quote from the parade speech provides more evidence of 
this shift in strategy:  
I pay high tribute to all the veterans, comrades, patriots, and offi-
cers in China who took part in the War of Resistance and all the 
Chinese at home and abroad who contributed significantly to the 
victory of the war. […] In defiance of aggression, the unyielding 
Chinese people fought gallantly and finally won total victory 
against the Japanese militarist aggressors, thus preserving China’s 
5,000-year-old civilisation and upholding the cause of peace of 
mankind. This remarkable feat made by the Chinese nation was 
rare in the history of war. (Xi 2015)  
In relation to this growing emphasis being put on a national victory, it 
is also interesting to note that not only communist but also nationalist 
veterans were invited to see the parade. This is arguably part of the 
party’s efforts to strengthen and broaden its legitimacy and try to 
reach all groups and parts of China, an endeavour that comes in the 
context of growing social and ethnic tensions and conflicts in Chinese 
society – all groups and parts of China have to unite and work to-
gether under the strong leadership of the party in order to realise the 
“Chinese dream.” To make this credible, the world has to be present-
ed as hostile – China’s national “rejuvenation” is taking place in the 
context of a resurgence of Japanese militarism and intensified US 
efforts to contain China, to prevent its rise, to keep it weak, just as 
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the colonial powers of the past did. Therefore all Chinese – the Chi-
nese nation – have to rally behind the party and together confront 
these hostile outside forces.  
The challenge is how to combine the need to present the world 
in this way with the wish to project a positive image and increase the 
attractiveness of China to the world. This is even more difficult be-
cause the parade comes at a time of more assertive Chinese behaviour 
both at home and abroad that supports the image of China as an 
opaque and erratic authoritarian (rising) power that is less and less 
inclined to tolerate opposition, whether internationally or domestical-
ly, to its goals and interests. In his speech at the parade, Xi clearly 
sought to present a positive image of China as a great power that has 
made positive contributions to peace and development in the world, 
saying, 
In the interest of peace, China will remain committed to peaceful 
development. We Chinese love peace. No matter how much 
stronger it may become, China will never seek hegemony or ex-
pansion. (Xi 2015) 
He continued,  
It [China] will never inflict its past suffering on any other nation. 
The Chinese people are resolved to pursue friendly relations with 
all other countries […] and make [a] greater contribution to man-
kind. (Xi 2015) 
In addition, Xi Jinping’s announcement at the parade that 300,000 
Chinese military personnel would be cut was presented as a sign of 
China’s peaceful intentions and efforts to uphold world peace, stress-
ing how China’s rise will continue to be a “win-win” development for 
the world (Xi 2015).  
The reception and coverage of the parade in the Western media 
show how Xi Jinping’s efforts to present a positive great power image 
and hence enhance Chinese soft power were not successful. The 
biggest Western newspapers and news channels directed their main 
focus on what was shown more than on what was said – for example, 
which state leaders attended, highlighting that there were no state 
leaders from Western countries, including the United States and Ja-
pan, while the Russian president Vladimir Putin and Sudan’s presi-
dent Omar al-Bashir were in attendance. This information was fur-
ther used to support the dominant Western media discourse of how a 
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militarily stronger and more assertive China increasingly confronts 
the US-led liberal world order (e.g. Phillips 2015; Hunt, Jiang, and 
Ripley 2015). By contrast, the Chinese media coverage of the parade 
in general terms pointed to the attendance of foreign state leaders and 
foreign military branches as proof that China had now strongly inte-
grated into, and become respected as a great power by, the interna-
tional community (e.g. Xinhua 2015). Western media coverage also 
heavily emphasised all the new military hardware shown in the par-
ade, even specifying in which conflict situations it could potentially be 
put to use (e.g. Hunt, Jiang, and Ripley 2015). This links to the third 
main objective of the parade – strategic deterrence.  
The parade also had a core external military function, which was 
to deter potential foreign adversaries who might otherwise interfere 
with or interrupt China’s road to national “rejuvenation.” That is one 
reason why so much advanced military hardware was on display and 
why so much of it was missiles – some of China’s most potent weap-
ons, which could pose the greatest threats to the United States and its 
allies in the event of conflict. It is what authoritative PLA sources 
refer to as “strategic deterrence” (ᡈ⮕ေខ, zhanlue weishe), where 
Beijing seeks to awe its potential adversaries into submission or at 
least grudging acquiescence regarding Beijing’s core interests and 
territorial claims (Chase and Chan 2016; Lanteigne 2016: 107–116). In 
order to get strategic deterrence to work, Beijing has to reveal arma-
ments that its likely opponents – the United States and its allies – 
would take seriously. Hence the need to show “big sticks” – among 
the many new things revealed, as part of an “Antiship Ballistic Missile 
Formation” was the so-called “carrier killer” missile, the DF-21D. 
Announced as an “assassin’s mace” at the parade, this missile has the 
potential to disable ships including US carrier strike groups, the centre-
piece of American sea power. Also paraded for the first time was the 
DF-26, which is China’s first missile capable of striking Guam with a 
conventional warhead from a homeland-based launcher. At the par-
ade all the major missiles were labelled with their English abbrevia-
tions in big white letters, which was likely done to help guarantee that 
their presence would not be overlooked and that their deterrence 
message would be sent. From Beijing’s perspective, its regional secur-
ity environment has deteriorated in the past few years, where territor-
ial and maritime boundary disputes with many regional countries, 
including Vietnam and the Philippines, have intensified. Under the 
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“rebalance to Asia” heading, the United States has increased its mili-
tary assets forward-deployed in the region and improved its security 
ties with many countries, especially those in active disputes with Chi-
na. This is likely an important reason why Xi Jinping did not want to 
wait to display the newest Chinese military hardware until 2019, 
which would have been following the cycle of big military parades in 
China every 10 years, but was inclined to show strength and resolve 
now amid the deteriorating regional security environment. In sum, 
while playing to a domestic audience, Xi also aimed to send a clear 
message across the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, the South Chi-
na Sea, and the Pacific saying that China had arrived as a great mili-
tary power and that its interests and claims must be taken seriously. 
The problem, or the challenge, for the Chinese leaders is that 
due to the military purpose of the parade – to enhance China’s stra-
tegic deterrence – the display of all the new military hardware and 
generally of China’s growing military strength backfired, especially 
because of the growing tension with neighbouring countries and the 
United States: rather than deterring others from challenging China, 
the parade underscored the military threat posed by China and af-
firmed the increasingly negative perceptions of Beijing’s intentions. 
Hence, the parade clearly worked against any soft power efforts and 
messages, and again it seems that China’s hard power is serving to 
undermine its soft power.  
There were several strong messages that the Chinese leadership 
aimed to send using the parade as the platform. In line with the theo-
retical argument on authoritarian states and soft power presented 
above, it is clear that the message to the domestic audience had the 
highest priority. The focus of the Chinese leadership was to bolster 
regime security. Regarding the context, the current Chinese leadership 
is facing many huge and complex domestic challenges, with stagnat-
ing economic growth, rising social inequality and tensions, and rising 
ethnic conflicts being among the most acute (e.g. Leibold 2013). Ac-
cording to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in recent years 
the annual number of major protests in China has exceeded 100,000 
(Tanner 2014). The party’s legitimacy rests primarily on two pillars: 
One is the party’s promise to deliver high economic growth, social 
stability, and improved living conditions for all. This has run into 
difficulties as the Chinese economy struggles. Therefore, the second 
pillar, the party’s promise to regain China’s great power position and 
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status, is being emphasised even more strongly, as evidenced by the 
parade, whose main message was that the party will lead the Chinese 
nation on the road to “rejuvenation” in defiance of outside efforts to 
prevent this. The aim is to direct the anger and frustration growing in 
the Chinese population outside and shift its focus away from domes-
tic problems and the weakness of the leadership to deal with these 
towards foreign threats and foreign causes of the problems. National-
ism – and an “us” vs. a hostile “other” constellation – is used to rally 
and mobilise the population behind the party recalling the historical 
nationalist narratives emphasising anti-Japanese, anti-American, and 
anti-Western emotions. This follows the distinction that has histori-
cally been drawn in the Chinese civilisational discourse between a 
morally superior China and a barbarian “other” (Wilson 2015: 288). 
That is, the Chinese leaders are actively constructing a rather hostile 
relation between “China” and “the world” to promote regime secur-
ity. Part of this is also the stronger emphasis in Chinese foreign policy 
statements under Xi Jinping on the protection and promotion of 
China’s “core interests” and “rightful territorial claims,” which plays 
into the development of more assertive Chinese foreign policy behav-
iour, especially in the South and East China Seas. Such rhetoric and 
foreign policy behaviour undermines any efforts at achieving soft 
power; moreover, given the display of China’s new military hardware 
in the parade itself, any statements about China’s peaceful intentions, 
“win-win” development, and so on, do not present themselves as 
credible. Instead, the result is what Hartig (2015: 254–255) terms an 
obvious perception gap, where the narrative that Beijing wants to 
project of China as a peaceful developing country that aims to con-
struct a harmonious world is confronted with an international audi-
ence that mainly perceives China as an increasingly belligerent rising 
power bullying its neighbours in East Asia. 
Conclusion 
Meeting and managing the challenges to regime security takes first 
priority for the Chinese leaders. The point is, however, that the Chi-
nese leaders’ efforts to boost both the party’s legitimacy and national 
cohesion decreases the room to manoeuvre for Chinese foreign pol-
icy and has strong negative consequences for China’s international 
image and its soft power efforts. It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
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reconcile the different messages and keep them within one common, 
credible, and attractive “China as a great power” story (Hartig 2015: 
249). The efforts to reassure the rest of the world that China’s rise 
will not pose a threat to peace and stability and that other countries 
will actually benefit from China’s growing power and influence seem 
impossible in the context of growing nationalism; stricter party con-
trol over all aspects of society, including over Chinese students and 
media outside of China; military modernisation; and growing tension 
with regional neighbours over territorial issues.  
The need to construct a rather hostile relation between “China” 
and “the world” in the context of growing regime security challenges 
and a more insecure Chinese leadership is also reflected in the way 
that the Chinese leadership in recent years has increasingly warned 
the Chinese people about “hostile forces” that seek to undermine 
stability and national cohesion. Hence, since 2011 in Chinese leaders’ 
speeches and in official documents, as well as in articles by Chinese 
scholars, there has been an growing emphasis on the urgent need to 
guard “cultural security” (᮷ॆᆹޘ, wenhua anquan), which involves 
shielding Chinese culture, values, and ideology from foreign threats 
(Edney 2015: 264–266). At the Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central 
Committee in late 2011, which focused specifically on the issue of 
cultural system reform, the need to protect national cultural security 
was highlighted as an important task that is becoming more difficult 
(CCP Central Committee 2011). Further, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan 
states, 
Facing increasing global ideological and cultural struggles, it is in-
creasingly urgent to strengthen national cultural capabilities and 
international competitiveness, to resist the cultural infiltration of 
foreign hostile forces, and to protect national cultural security. 
(CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council 2012, author’s 
translation)  
This also comes in the context of the wave of colour revolutions in 
other authoritarian states, which clearly has put the Chinese leader-
ship on high alert with regards to preventing similar frustration and 
anger from growing in China and having the people mobilise against 
the leadership (Wilson 2015: 290). Consequently, there has also been 
an aggressive effort by the Chinese leadership in recent years to crack 
down on any form of dissidence and to get new societal actors, dy-
namics, and organisations under control and co-opted into the party-
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state structure. A new law, “The Management of Foreign Non-Gov-
ernmental Organisations’ Activities Within Mainland China” (ѝॾӪ
≁ޡ઼ഭຳཆ䶎᭯ᓌ㓴㓷ຳ޵⍫ࣘ㇑⨶⌅, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
jingwai feizhangfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanlifa), adopted at the 12th 
meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s 
Congress in late April 2016, makes it more difficult for foreign non-
governmental organisations to continue their presence and work in 
China. They will be facing more uncertainty, control, and restrictions 
(Xinhua 2016c; BBC 2016). This so-called FNGO law should also be 
seen in the context of a more insecure Chinese leadership seeking to 
strengthen its hold on Chinese society. Again, the new regulations 
and efforts to exercise more control over developments in Chinese 
society are legitimised by referring to a China that finds itself in the 
middle of an overall ideological and cultural struggle, whereby foreign 
forces – the “other” – have hostile intentions and seek to make use 
of subversive and illegitimate methods in order to impose Western 
ideology and values and ultimately to Westernise – “imperialise” in 
the Leninist-Maoist vocabulary – China and split it up. Therefore, the 
entire Chinese nation should rally behind the party in order to resist 
this (e.g. Huanqiu 2016). 
While the Chinese leadership is seeking to build favour and at-
tractiveness in the international system, they are more concerned with 
regime security challenges and safeguarding their legitimacy and na-
tional cohesion at home, and because nationalism is often used to 
mobilise the population, it complicates and often works against any 
soft power efforts. The key is that “Chinese” continue to be defined 
in opposition to hostile “others” and that the humiliation narrative 
continues to function as the central identity marker in the party-led 
construction of national identity (the “us”). In many ways, China still 
does not have a stable national identity, and the Chinese leaders’ fo-
cus is on stabilising the one that best ensures regime security – and 
that is surely not the same one that promotes a positive image of 
China outside China. Primarily due to the complex contingent dy-
namics at play between, on the one hand, ongoing domestic trends 
and developments, especially in party–society relations, and, on the 
other hand, the Chinese leadership’s ability to project soft power and 
generally to promote and manage China’s international image, soft 
power will continue to be the weak link in China’s pursuit of a great 
power position and status.  
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Soft power is about the non-coercive ability to change the pref-
erences of others, to make them want what you want purely by the 
force of attraction and persuasion. This is not an easy task for authori-
tarian states. The analysis of the 2015 military parade in Beijing shows 
the complex, contingent domestic/international dynamics at play 
when authoritarian states engage in the promotion and management 
of their international image and attempt to project soft power. On a 
more theoretical note, the above analysis underlines that especially 
when dealing with authoritarian states, it is necessary to “de-Western-
ise” the understanding of soft power and not simply approach soft 
power as a matter of examining the soft power resources of the states 
(cf. also Edney 2015: 269). It also requires examining the threat and 
risk assessments that lie behind the soft power strategies of authori-
tarian states. Regime security is the central concern for leaders in 
authoritarian states, and therefore addressing regime security issues 
always takes priority, even if that works to undermine soft power 
aims and efforts. Furthermore, soft power in authoritarian states also 
has to be seen as part of a controlled and deliberate strategy that is 
both externally and internally directed with an explicit focus on deal-
ing with perceived external and internal challenges and threats to 
regime legitimacy and national cohesion. As argued in the theoretical 
section above, the priority, content, and direction of the soft power 
narratives in authoritarian states will vary with the degree of domestic 
insecurity and vulnerability felt by the leadership. This again under-
lines the qualitative difference between the threat and risk assess-
ments that influence how leaders in authoritarian states approach and 
practise soft power and those that influence Western liberal democra-
cies (cf. also Edney 2015: 269; Callahan 2015: 225).  
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